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Federal Taxation
by Suellen M. Wolfe*
and
Jennifer N. Moore"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined prominent and
controversial tax issues during 2000. The technically difficult concept
of cancellation of indebtedness income as it relates to the basis of a
Subchapter S shareholder's interest was examined just prior to the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of this tax concept. The
Supreme Court agreed with the interpretation of Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C.") section 1366 espoused by the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh
Circuit also examined an issue that the Supreme Court may soon
consider when the circuit court followed the lead of an early 2000 Tax
Court case examining the tax consequences of a corporate stock
redemption incident to a divorce.
Though the Eleventh Circuit
characterizes the transaction as a tax free sale to the nonredeeming
spouse under the provisions of I.R.C. section 1041, disagreement among
the circuits and split decisions of the lower courts insure further
examination of the Eleventh Circuit's position. The Eleventh Circuit
also determined that an amount received for damages to business
reputation received before the amendment to I.R.C. section 104(a)(2) on
August 20, 1996, is excluded from tax. In that case, the court was
required to revisit the concepts articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Schleier' and United States v.

* Visiting Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law.
Pennsylvania State University (B.H., 1973); Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson
School of Law (J.D., 1976); New York University School of Law (LL.M., 1979).
** Mars Hill College (B.A., magna cum laude, 1991); Boise State University (M.A.,
magna cum laude, 1996); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2001).
1. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
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Burke.2 A case involving a procedural issue examined whether the
action of a tax matters partner ("TMP") is binding on the partners and
whether the partners were informed of administrative and judicial
proceedings occurring on the partnership level. In addition, common tax
transactions causing disagreement over the appropriate legal standard
to be applied were also reviewed. The Eleventh Circuit denied a payor
spouse an income tax deduction for a payment required by a divorce
agreement. The payment was held to constitute child support because
it was deemed to be fixed by a divorce instrument. Another case
involving reimbursed traveling expenses reversed the grant of a
summary judgment to the government.
II. JURISDICTION OF TAX COURT TO DENY LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO
VACATE ASSESSMENT OF TAX LIABILITY OF PARTNERSHIP FILED BY
TMP

In Davenport Recycling Associates v. Commissioner,3 the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision denying leave to file a motion
to vacate its order upholding a tax assessment against a limited
partnership.' Respondent Davenport Recycling Associates ("Davenport")
was a limited partnership. Davenport's general partner and its TMP 5
was Sam Winer. Ernest and Marion Karras and DL Associates ("DL")
were limited partners.6
Davenport and its partners were audited for the years 1982 through
1985. On February 18, 1986, Winer was enjoined from marketing
certain partnership interests and from serving as TMP. Davenport's
limited partners were notified of Winer's removal as Davenport's TMP.
DL served as TMP until it was determined that, as a limited partner, it
was ineligible to serve. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and Winer
obtained a court order permitting Winer to serve again as Davenport's
TMP performing administrative services.7
Winer, as TMP, signed extensions to the statute of limitations for the
audits for Davenport. An assessment of taxes was eventually issued by
the IRS for the years 1982-1985. After notifying the Davenport
partners, Winer appealed the assessment to the tax court. No partner

2. 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
3. 220 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2000).
4. Id. at 1256.
5. The tax management partner is empowered to act as an agent on behalf of the
partners in connection with a partnership audit including ensuing judicial proceedings.
I.R.C. § 6231(a)(7) (2000).
6. 220 F.3d at 1256.
7.

Id. at 1257-58.
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of Davenport filed a motion at the Tax Court or moved to participate in
the appeal. Winer, acting as TMP, eventually conceded to the adjustments, and the tax court entered the order on February 23, 1994. Winer
failed to serve various documents about the case's disposition to the
partners as required by tax court rules.8
The Karrases sought leave to file a motion to vacate on January 23,
1996, contending that Winer did not have authority to represent
Davenport before the tax court because of the injunction prohibiting his
service. They also contended that the IRS's failure to inform the tax
court of the injunction constituted fraud. After an evidentiary hearing,
the tax court denied the leave to file the motion.9
The Eleventh Circuit examined whether the tax court abused its
discretion in denying the leave to file the motion.' Typically, the tax
court lacks jurisdiction to vacate a decision once it becomes final."
However, the court has some discretion to extend the stated thirty-day
limitation that is imposed after its order is entered. 12 The extension
can be granted only when (1) the decision is shown to be void or a legal
nullity for lack ofjurisdiction over either the subject matter or the party;
(2) there has been fraud on the court; or (3) the decision was based on
mutual mistake. 3 The Karrases premised their argument before the
Eleventh Circuit on the first two contentions. 4
The Karrases' subject matter jurisdiction argument was based on the
assertion that Winer had no authority to consent to the extensions of the
statute to assess Davenport and its partners. 5 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the tax court's holding that the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense that has to be raised by the partnership. 6 It does
not involve the subject matter jurisdiction of the tax court. 17 The
failure of the Karrases to file a timely petition to vacate the tax court's
order precluded them from asserting that Winer, acting as TMP, had a
conflict of interest thereby nullifying his action binding Davenport. 8

8. Id.
9. Id. at 1258.

10. Id.
11. Id. at 1259 (citing Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 114 F.3d 795, 798
(8th Cir. 1997)).
12. Id. (citing Billingsley v. Commissioner, 868 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 1989)).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1260.
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The Karrases also argued that the tax court lacked jurisdiction over
the parties because Winer had no authority to appear before the tax
court on behalf of Davenport. 9 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
doctrine of implied ratification, recognized and as interpreted by New
York, was properly applied by the tax court."0 The Eleventh Circuit
also concluded that the tax court did not abuse its discretion when it
held that the Karrases accepted the benefit of Winer's authority, were
properly notified, and impliedly ratified Winer's actions.2 '
The Karrases' final argument, that the order of the tax court was
procured by fraud, had to be strictly construed. It is applied only when
the ability of the court to render an impartial decision is compromised.2" The Eleventh Circuit held that no fraud had been committed
on the tax court and affirmed the tax court's denial of leave to file a
motion to vacate its order.23
III.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS STRICT STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION OF I.R.C. SECTION 1366 PERMITrING THE BASIS OF S
CORPORATION SHAREHOLDER'S STOCK TO BE INCREASED BY THE
AMOUNT OF CANCELLATION OF INDEBTEDNESS

In Gitlitz v. Commissioner,24 the United States Supreme Court
sanctioned the taxing concepts articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in
Pugh v. Commissioner.25 In Pugh the Eleventh Circuit held that
cancellation of debt ("COD") income, tax exempt because of the
insolvency of the S corporation, is an item of income that passes through
to the shareholders increasing their tax basis in the S corporation.26
The tax benefit for the taxpayers in Gitlitz and Pugh differs because of
their respective tax positions. However, the second principle articulated
by the Supreme Court, that the pass through of amounts occurs before
the reduction of the S corporation's tax attributes," makes the taxpayer's position in Pugh stronger.
The income of an S corporation is not taxed at the corporate level
because the shareholders of the corporation determine their tax liability
by reporting their pro rata share of the S corporation's items of income.

19. Id. at 1261.
20. Id.

21. Id. at 1262.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24.
25.

531 U.S. 206 (2001).
213 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000).

26. Id. at 1324-25.
27. See Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at.
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I.R.C. section 136628 specifically states that items of income include tax
exempt income.2 9 The character of items of income "shall be determined as if such item were realized directly from the source from which
realized by the corporation,
or occurred in the same manner as incurred
3
by the corporation." 1
Appellant Pugh was a shareholder in Epoch Capital Corporation
("Epoch"), an S corporation. In 1990 Epoch, then insolvent, had
$661,357 in debt forgiven. The corporation liquidated, and Pugh did not
receive any liquidating distribution.3 1
Pugh's appeal was brought to determine the amount of loss in his
investment in Epoch. Because there was no amount realized by Pugh
on the liquidation of Epoch, his basis in the stock would determine the
amount of loss he was entitled to recognize. Pugh sought to increase his
basis in order to increase his reportable loss.32
Cancellation of indebtedness generally constitutes income to the
debtor.33 Because Epoch was insolvent, the cancellation of debt income
was excluded from the income of the S corporation at the corporate
level.34 An S corporation determines its income in the year of discharge, but to the extent that its COD income is excluded, it is required
to reduce its favorable tax attributes.35 In most cases the amount of
COD income excluded offsets net operating losses or capital loss carryovers. However, Epoch had no tax attributes to offset. 6
The separate treatment of an item of income could affect the tax
liability of a shareholder. Despite the fact that the COD income was
excluded on the S corporation level and did not reduce any tax attributes
of Epoch, Pugh treated the COD income as an item of income passing
through to him that, though tax exempt, increased the basis of his stock
in Epoch.37
The Commissioner asserted deficiencies against Pugh contending that
he was not entitled to increase the basis in his Epoch stock by the
amount of the COD income. Pugh appealed to the tax court, which held
for the government.3" Pugh then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit,

28.
29.

I.R.C. § 1366 (2000).
Id.

30. Id. § 1366(b).
31. 213 F.3d at 1325.

32. Id.
33. I.R.C. § 108 (2000).
34. 213 F.3d at 1327.

35. I.R.C. §§ 108(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(D).
36. 213 F.3d at 1330.
37. Id. at 1325.

38. Id.

1478

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

which held that I.R.C. section 1366(a)(1) clearly specifies COD income
as an item of income that passes through to the shareholder. 9 Pugh
was permitted to increase the basis of his stock under I.R.C. section
1367, thus increasing the loss he reported. 40
A.

Characterof Tax Exempt Income
In Pugh the IRS argued that the COD income does not pass through
to the shareholder because it is not an item of income. It continued that
if the S corporation does not use the COD income to reduce its tax
attribute, it has no further tax effect. The IRS also contended that an
S corporation shareholder will ultimately include the tax exempt amount
in his income when it is actually distributed. At distribution, there is a
corresponding reduction in his basis. The IRS asserted that I.R.C.
section 108 income is never actually distributed because it is constructive income and the described taxing mechanism typical to tax exempt
income never occurs. Therefore, COD income is an atypical type of tax
exempt income that should be treated differently. The Commissioner
also argued that if COD 41
income reduces tax attributes, then it is
technically not tax exempt.
The Eleventh Circuit first examined the nature of COD income.42
Typically, COD income passes through to an S corporation's shareholders.43 The court noted that I.R.C. section 108 provides for the exclusion
of this income by an insolvent taxpayer.44 However, I.R.C. section
108(d)(7)(A) also provides that the corporation must reduce its tax
attributes at the corporate level as a result of nontaxable COD.45 The
Eleventh Circuit held that the I.R.C. does not preclude the COD income
from affecting tax at the shareholder level.4 The Eleventh Circuit
further held that I.R.C. section 1366 specifically provides that all items
of corporate income that could affect a shareholder's tax liability pass
through to him as if "incurred in the same manner as incurred by the
corporation."47
An S corporation shareholder is required to carry over losses that
exceed his adjusted basis in the stock.4" Eventually the suspended
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1327-31.
Id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1327.

44. Id.

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1328 (quoting I.R.C. §§ 1366(a)(1)(A), (b) (2000)).
48. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2).
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losses can affect a shareholder's tax liability. If a shareholder has
suspended losses, the receipt of COD income, as an item of income, may
decrease the amount of suspended losses. Pugh's individual tax position
made his tax effect unique because he had no suspended losses and
Epoch liquidated. Therefore, the COD income would never directly affect
his tax liability.49
Even though Pugh had no suspended losses and the COD income could
not affect Pugh's tax liability, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
item still passed through to Pugh. ° The Eleventh Circuit noted that
tax exempt income constitutes a pass through item even though it did
not affect the taxpayer's tax liability.' Comparing COD income to tax
exempt income (which passes through to the shareholder pursuant to
I.R.C. section 1366(a)(1)(A)), the Eleventh Circuit held that COD income
is a type of excluded income. 2 I.R.C. section 108 is not distinguishable
from other receipts defined in Part III Subchapter B of the tax code or
"Items Specifically Excluded from Gross Income."53
Increase in Basis

B.

The Eleventh Circuit further held that an S corporation's COD income
passes through pro rata to its shareholders under I.R.C. section
1366(a)(1) in all instances. 4 Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C. section 1367,
Pugh was entitled to increase his basis by the amount of COD income
that flowed through to him from Epoch. 5
The Eleventh Circuit recognized that economics of the transaction may
warrant a different conclusion, but it was convinced that the language
of the Code is clear. 6 A technical correction of the tax code is the
province of Congress. Though a distributive share of the income of an
S corporation's shareholder did not include cancellation of indebtedness
income because the partnership was insolvent, the shareholder's basis
increased by his share of the COD income. Pugh was permitted to
recognize a loss calculated by a basis that was increased by the amount
of COD income that passed through to him.57

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

213 F.3d at 1328-29.
Id. at 1329.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1328-30.
Id. at 1330-31.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1330-31.
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IV. EXPENSE REIMBURSEMENT SCHEME AS AN ACCOUNTABLE PER
DIEM ALLOWANCE

In Trucks, Inc. v. United States,5" the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
grant of the Government's motion for summary judgment.59 It held
that whether an employer had a reasonable expectation that traveling
of its employees would be incurred is a
expenses it reimbursed to some
60
question of fact for the jury.
Appellant Trucks, Inc. ("Trucks"), operates a trucking company in
Texas and in the southern and eastern coastal states. Expenses
incurred by the drivers for food, lodging, and incidental costs were
reimbursed by Trucks on a per diem rate based on load revenue. The
drivers were required to submit documentation of their trip. Trucks
then paid the drivers fourteen percent of load revenue as wages and an
additional six percent of load revenue as reimbursement of expenses
incurred while traveling.6 '
Believing that it reasonably anticipated and calculated its drivers'
expenses, Trucks asserted that the reimbursement was not considered
wages to the drivers. The company did not withhold employment taxes
on the portion of the payment to the drivers representing the travel
expense reimbursement. The IRS determined these payments were
wages and assessed Trucks's employment taxes, penalties, and interest.
Trucks partially paid the amount of the assessment and sued for a
refund and abatement of all other IRS assessments.
A deduction from adjusted gross income of an employer is permitted
for reimbursed expenses of employees. 63 The law has very strict
substantiation requirements for reimbursed expenses. An employer
must have a reimbursement or other expense allowance arrangement.
An employer's reimbursement of its employees' expenses may be exempt
64
from employment taxes if payment is made from an accountable plan.
A plan is accountable when (1) it covers only expenses with a business
connection; (2) all expenses are substantiated to the employer; and (3)
the employee is required to return to the employer any amount paid in
excess of the substantiated expenses.65

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

234 F.3d 1340 (2000).
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1343-44.
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1341-42.
Id. at 1342 (quoting I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(A) (2000)).
Id. (quoting I.R.C. Reg. 1.62-2(c)(2)(i)).
Id. at 1342-43 (citing I.R.C. Reg. 1.62-2(d), (e), (0).
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The district judge found that Truck's method of reimbursement of
expenses violated the first requirement of an accountable plan and
granted a summary judgment to the government. Trucks appealed the
award of the summary judgment.6 6 The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
case de novo and applied the standards of the district court applicable
to an award of summary judgment.67 The Eleventh Circuit found that
Trucks presented sufficient evidence to create a factual question as to its
state of mind.' Based on American Airlines, Inc. v. United States,6 9
Trucks had met its initial burden of proof, precluding a summary
judgment for the Government. 7
Trucks's purported "accountable plan" was analyzed by the Eleventh
Circuit in the context of the three prongs of the test articulated by the
regulations. 7' The deposition of Trucks' owner was examined to
ascertain if the first requirement, that the reimbursed expenses had a
business purpose, was satisfied. A reimbursement has a business
connection if it is "'paid or incurred by the employee in connection with
the performance of services as an employee of the employer.'"72 The
payment also must be made only for expenses the employee would be
reasonably expected to incur.7
Some of Trucks' drivers paid for lodging, and some slept in the
sleeping compartment of their trucks. Regardless of where the drivers
rested, Trucks' paid them a per diem flat rate. The district court found
that the lack of record keeping and an affidavit filed by Trucks' owner
stating that she did not know how many nights the drivers actually
incurred lodging expenses violate the business connection requirement.74
The deposition of the owner described her investigation into standard
business practices of the trucking industry, which she used in establishing Trucks' reimbursement plan.75 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
whether Trucks could have reasonably expected its drivers to incur
expenses that were standard within its industry was a question of fact.76

66.
67.

Id. at 1343.
Id. at 1342 (citing Mays v. United States, 763 F.2d 1295, 1296 (11th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam)).
68. Id. at 1344.
69. 204 F.3d 1103 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
70. 234 F.3d at 1343.
71. Id. at 1343-45.
72. Id. at 1343 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(d)(1)).
73. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(d)(3)(i)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1343-44.
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The Eleventh Circuit also examined the final two prongs of an
accountable plan: substantiation and return of excess reimbursement."
Generally, an employee must substantiate the payment of expenses to
his employer. However, the IRS will accept reimbursement of a flat rate
per diem without the typical substantiation if certain requirements are
met.78 Trucks claimed that its policy met the requirements of a per
diem allowance. 79 The Eleventh Circuit found that Trucks produced
some evidence its plan was reasonable as to calculations and assumptions,8 0and this evidence should be examined by a jury for its reasonableness.

The third prong of a plan requires an employee return the excess
amount for days of travel not substantiated.8" An exception (similar to
the per diem exception for the substantiation requirement) is applicable
to the return of excess requirement. 82 Trucks asserted it satisfied this
exception because it knew how many days its drivers incurred expenses."3 The Eleventh Circuit also identified Truck's reasonable anticipation of expenses as a jury question. 4
In concluding its analysis, the Eleventh Circuit held that Trucks
produced sufficient evidence to show genuine factual dispute over the
reasonableness of its decision that expense reimbursements were paid
under an accountable per diem allowance.8"
V. FIXED PAYMENTS UNDER SECTION 71(c)
In Preston v. Commissioner,8 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a tax
court decision holding that certain payments made by Mr. Preston were
not deductible as alimony under I.R.C. section 215 because the payments
were child support under I.R.C. section 71(c). 7 The Eleventh Circuit
found that a payment is fixed within the meaning of section 71(c) if the
payment is earmarked by a temporary or final order for specific expenses
of the spouse's children.8

77. Id. at 1344-45.
78. Id. at 1344.

79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1344-45.
Id. at 1344.
Id. at 1345.
Id.

85. Id.
86.
87.
88.

209 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1284.
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Forest Preston and Diane Sowell married in 1974 and thereafter had
two children. Sowell filed for divorce in 1992, and the Superior Court of
Muscogee County issued a temporary order detailing Preston's financial
responsibilities to his family. Preston was to pay the medical, dental,
and prescription drug expenses incurred by his wife and children; school
tuition and expenses for his children; both his wife's and children's
clothing costs; as well as monthly payments totaling $1,500 to his wife.
When the final order was entered in 1993, Preston was required to pay
his son's private school tuition and his daughter's car insurance. In
addition, he was to pay $1,600 per month in child support.8 9
In 1992 and 1993 Preston claimed alimony deductions for payments
he made to Sowell and other deductions for expenses he incurred on
behalf of his children pursuant to the temporary order. In 1992 the
deducted expenses included a doctor's bill and dentist's bill, as well as
a payment for his daughter's school tuition. In 1993 the deducted
expenses included amounts he paid pursuant to the final order for his
son's tuition and daughter's car insurance. The tax court ruled that the
payments were nondeductible child support and thus denied the
deductions.90
Payments for alimony are included in the income of the spouse
receiving the payments and are deductible to the spouse making the
payments.9 However, I.R.C. section 71(c) specifically excludes from
this rule "that part of any payment which the terms of the divorce or
separation instrument fix (in terms of an amount of money or a part of
the payment) as a sum which is payable for the support of children of
the payor spouse."92 At issue in Preston was whether, under I.R.C.
section 71(c), the payments Preston was required to make were "'fix[ed]
(in terms of an amount of money or a part of the payment)' by the
temporary or final order" as payments made for the support of his
children. 93 If the payments were fixed as a sum payable for the
children by the temporary or final order, Preston could not take the
deductions. Preston relied on Commissioner v. Lester94 even though the
ultimate holding of the case had been statutorily overruled by I.R.C.
section 71(c)(2).9" Preston argued that the reasoning in Lester should
persuade the court in this case that the payments he made were alimony

89. Id. at 1283-84.
90. Id. at 1284.
91. I.R.C. § 71(a) (2000).

92. Id. § 71(c)(1).
93. 209 F.3d at 1284 (quoting I.R.C. § 71(c)(1)).
94. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).

95. 209 F.3d at 1284.
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because the payments required by the temporary or final order were not
a specific fixed amount and thus were "general support payments."96
However, the court found that the payments required by the temporary or final order were fixed in the sense that they were "earmarked
97
The court
...for the specific expenses of the children as they arose."
of the
each
fixed
final
orders
and
reasoned that because the temporary
for
exclusively
as
payable
expenses
individual payments of the children's
by
the
the support of the children, "each payment was fixed at 100%
applicable order."98 Therefore, Preston was not entitled to deduct the
payments from his income.9 9
VI.

ADOPTION OF READ V. COMMISSIONER TO DETERMINE MEANING

OF "ON BEHALF OF" UNDER I.R.C. SECTION 1041
In Craven v. United States,"°° the Eleventh Circuit adopted the tax
court's decision in Read v. Commissioner... and held that the redemption of a former wife's stock in a closely-held corporation pursuant to the
divorce settlement agreement was a transfer on behalf of her former
husband incident to divorce and therefore qualified for nonrecognition
under I.R.C. section 1041.102
The Cravens (Billy Joe and Linda) married in 1966 and started their
own pottery business in 1971. In 1975 Billy Joe incorporated the
business as Craven Pottery, Inc., with Billy Joe owning fifty-one percent
of the company stock, Linda owning forty-seven percent of the stock, and
the remaining two percent owned by the Cravens' two children. When
the Cravens' marriage turned sour, Linda stopped working at the
corporation. The Cravens separated in 1988, and a divorce decree was
entered into in 1991. The decree contained a settlement agreement
under which Linda agreed to sell, and the corporation agreed to buy, her
stock in Craven Pottery, Inc.'0
As payment for the stock, the corporation gave Linda a $4.8 million
promissory note, with Billy Joe guaranteeing the note with an express
acknowledgment that the note's terms were of direct interest and benefit
to him. The note was to be paid in 120 equal monthly payments
beginning July 2000. Lump sum payments on the note of $1 million

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1284-85.
100. 215 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2000).
101. 114 T.C. 14 (2000).
102. 215 F.3d at 1207.
103. Id. at 1202.
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each were also to be made in June 2000, 2005, and 2010, but the
corporation could pay any amount due under the note before its due date
by paying its then present value. Any prepayments were to be applied
against the lump sum payments beginning with the one due in 2010,
then against the 2005 payment, then the 2000 payment. In 1991 Billy
Joe made a prepayment on the note, and the corporation made the
remaining three prepayments in 1992, 1993, and 1998.104
On her tax returns for 1992, 1993, and 1994, Linda did not report
capital gains from the redemption of her stock in the corporation.
However, she did take the position (in disclosure statements) that the
redemption qualified for nonrecognition under I.R.C. section 1041. The
IRS disagreed and determined that Linda had capital gains based on the
principal of the prepayments on the note. Linda paid the tax and
interest due, filed a claim for a refund, and when the claim was denied,
10 5
sued for a refund in district court.
The district court found that Linda's redemption fell under I.R.C.
section 1041 because it was within the confines of a Treasury Department Temporary Regulation, Temp. Treas. Reg. section 1.1041-1T(c)
(Q&A 9).16
The regulation states that in certain circumstances
transfers of property to a third party on behalf of a spouse or former
spouse may qualify under I.R.C. section 1041.07 Because Billy Joe
was obligated under Georgia law to divide equitably all marital assets,
the district court found that the corporation's redemption of Linda's
stock was on behalf of Billy Joe. Also persuasive to the district court
were Billy Joe's guarantee of the note and the fact that Billy Joe had, in
effect, complete control of the corporation after the redemption. 08
Also, the district court found that Arnes v. United States'0 9 (Arnes I)
was applicable to this case. Arnes I contains a similar fact pattern: The
divorcing spouses in Arnes I each owned fifty percent of a McDonald's
franchise. Per McDonald's policy, when spouses divorced, ownership of
the entire franchise had to be transferred to one spouse. Therefore, the
wife sold her fifty percent interest to the corporation with her husband
guaranteeing payment to the wife. The transfer was made pursuant to
the divorce decree."0 The Ninth Circuit found that I.R.C. section 1041

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1202-03.
Id. at 1203.
Id.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(c) (1984).
215 F.3d at 1203.
981 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 457.
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applied to the transfer because the redemption relieved the husband of
his obligation to purchase his wife's stock."'
If I.R.C. section 1041 did not apply to the redemption of Linda's stock,
the redemption would be treated as a sale under I.R.C. sections 302(a)
and (b)(3).1 2 Linda would have gain in the amount the proceeds from
the redemption exceeded her basis in the stock.13 The IRS determined
that Linda had capital gains on the principal of the prepayments in the
amounts of $187,922 in 1992, and $285,709 in 1993.114 If I.R.C.
section 1041 applied to Linda's redemption, Linda would not be required
to recognize gain on the principal of the prepayments because property
received in an I.R.C. section 1041 transfer is excluded from the
recipient's gross income." '
To decide the issue in this case, the Eleventh Circuit relied on a
Treasury Department Temporary Regulation, the Ninth Question of
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041 - 1T(c).1 6 The answer to the Ninth
Question describes three situations in which a transfer to a third party
"'on behalf of a spouse (or former spouse) [would] qualify under I.R.C.
§ 1041.""'"
Linda argued that her redemption fell under the first
situation: "'where the transfer to the third party is required by a
divorce or separation instrument.""' 8
The court found that the central question in this case was whether
Linda's transfer of her stock to the corporation was made on behalf of
Billy Joe." 9 After noting the district court's reliance on Arnes I and
the questions and problems Arnes I raised, the court turned its attention
to Read and adopted its reasoning.'2 ° In Read the tax court resolved
the issues raised in Arnes I that were not addressed by the Ninth Circuit
or were in conflict with subsequent decisions.' 2 ' The facts of Read are
even more similar to this case than the Arnes I facts. The husband and
wife in Read were the sole owners of the voting stock and sole owners of
almost all of the nonvoting stock of the corporation. The divorce decree
required that the husband buy out the wife's shares in the corporation
by having the corporation purchase the wife's stock and issuing a
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promissory note to the wife for the balance of the purchase price. The
husband in
Read individually guaranteed the corporation's payments to
22
the wife.1
The issue in Read was whether the temporary regulation allowed the
wife to exclude the gain on the transfer of her stock to the corporation. 123 The tax court found that the phrase "on behalf' did not require
that the husband have a "primary-and-unconditional-obligation" to
purchase the stock."24 The "primary-and-unconditional-obligation"
standard applies when the corporation pays a debt for the husband. The
payment is then deemed a dividend to the husband.125 Instead, the
tax court determined that the plain meaning of "on behalf should apply
in cases like Read, and therefore the transfer must be "in the interest of"
the husband or "as a representative of" the husband.126 Thus, the
wife's transfer in Read fell under I.R.C. section
1041 because the
127
corporation was acting on behalf of the husband.
The Eleventh Circuit found that three facts place Linda within the
Read analysis: "(1) she was redeeming her stock pursuant to the divorce
settlement; (2) Billy Joe guaranteed the note; and (3) in that note Billy
Joe acknowledged that its terms were of 'direct interest, benefit and
advantage' to him. " 128 The court found that the first fact alone
qualified the transaction under I.R.C. section 1041 and that the other
two strengthened the conclusion.12 9 Therefore, the court held that the
proceeds of Linda's transfer qualified for nonrecognition under I.R.C.
section 1041.130
VII.

EXCLUDABILITY OF DAMAGES RECEIVED FOR A NONPHYSICAL
INJURY IN A TORT ACTION

During the 2000 survey period, the Eleventh Circuit examined an
issue that arose prior to the amendment of I.R.C. section 104(a)(2) by the
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996.11 The amendment dealt
13 2
with damages received for a nonphysical injury in a tort action.
After August 20, 1996, these damages are not excludable from gross
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income.' 33 In Fabry v. Commissioner,34 the amendment did not
apply because the damages award received by the taxpayers was paid in
'
1992. 35

Mr. and Mrs. Fabry owned a very successful nursery specializing in
ornamental plants and citrus trees. When the Fabrys began using a
fungicide manufactured by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. in 1988,
their business and reputation took a sharp downturn. The fungicide
caused the Fabrys' plants to yellow and their growth to be stunted.
Many of the plants died. When previously sold plants began to develop
defects, the Fabrys were forced to close their business. They sued du
Pont, seeking damages for lost profits, lost going concern value, and
damage to business reputation. Among other things, the Fabrys sought
$500,000 in damages for their lost business reputation when settlement
discussions commenced. Following mediation in 1992, du Pont paid the
Fabrys $38 million in full settlement of their claims against the
company. However, the Fabrys, on their 1992 returns, did not include
as income the $500,000 they received from du Pont that was attributable
to damage to their business reputation. The Commissioner of the IRS
assessed a tax deficiency of $201,054 plus $40,211 in penalty against the
Fabrys, who argued that I.R.C. section 104(a)(2) did not require them to
report the $500,000 as taxable income. The tax court agreed with the
Commissioner, and the Fabrys appealed. 136
While the tax court acknowledged during trial that the Fabrys' case
presented a question of law, it used a facts and circumstances approach
in its analysis, focusing on the nature of the Fabrys' claims against du
Pont. The tax court did not find specific language in the Fabrys' release
with du Pont to indicate the $500,000 in question was received on
account of personal injuries. The tax court also looked for specific
language asserting personal injuries in the Fabrys' first amended
complaint as well as in the mediation process, the settlement negotiations, and supporting documents.' 37 Finding none, the tax court found
"insufficient evidence of a claim for personal injury presented during the
lawsuit sufficient to support a conclusion that the Fabrys' $500,000
claim for damages to business reputation was on account of personal
injuries."'3 8

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1262 n.1.
223 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1262.
Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1269.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).

20011

FEDERAL TAXATION

1489

On appeal the Eleventh Circuit scrutinized the meaning of "personal
injuries" in I.R.C. section 104(a)(2), which provides that judgment or
settlement damages received for personal injuries or sickness are
excludable from gross income.139 Looking to the regulations first, the
court noted that the regulations equate the term "personal injuries" with
violation of tort or tort-type rights. 4 ° Next, after laying the groundwork for its decision by describing inconsistent case law among the
circuits in this area, the court turned its attention to Supreme Court
decisions decided in 1992 and after that addressed the application of
I.R.C. section 104(a)(2).14 1 The court noted that Commissioner v.
Schleier142 and United States v. Burke' 43 were the two cases most

pertinent to its decision.' 44 In Burke the Supreme Court applied I.R.C.
section 104(a)(2) to deny exclusion unless the underlying law or statute
provided for personal injury losses. 145 In Schleier the Court established a two-prong test under which the taxpayer must meet two
independent requirements for the damages associated with tort-like
personal injuries to qualify under I.R.C. section 104(a)(2) for exclusion:
"First, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the underlying cause of
action giving rise to the recovery is based upon tort or tort type rights;
and second, the taxpayer must show that the damages were received on
account of personal injuries or sickness." 46 Noting that Burke and
Schleier do not address the precise issue before it in the Fabrys' case, the
Eleventh Circuit looked to other circuits for application of those
cases.'"4
The court found a Sixth Circuit decision, Greer v. United
States,1 helpful in interpreting the second prong of the Schleier
test. 149 Greer involved a taxpayer who was discharged with a severance package of $331,968, $280,968 of which he claimed was in
settlement of his potential wrongful discharge claim and was therefore
excludable from gross income. Greer argued that his termination
"diminished his personal and professional reputation, and inflicted
stress, humiliation, mental anguish, self doubt and emotional pain" upon
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him. 5 ° The district court agreed with Greer.'51 On appeal the Sixth
Circuit separated the two-prong test from Schleier into four elements:
(1) there was an underlying claim sounding in tort; (2) the claim
existed at the time of settlement; (3)the claim encompassed personal
injuries; and (4) the agreement was executed "in lieu" of the prosecution of the tort claim and "on account of" the personal injury, rendering
it a settlement rather than a mere severance agreement." 2
Applying this four-prong test, the Sixth Circuit found that
claims of
15 3
nonphysical injuries could still be proven to be excludable.
In its own analysis, the Eleventh Circuit first took issue with the facts
and circumstances approach taken by the tax court.'54 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed with the tax court, finding its method of looking to the
record for the words "personal injury" to be not only insufficient, but also
incorrect.' 55 The court next determined that to satisfy the two-prong
Schleier test, a causal link between the tort and the intangible element
of the injury must exist. 156 If that link exists, the court noted, Schleier
would appear to be satisfied, and payments received for the personal
157
injury damages would be excludable under I.R.C. section 104(a)(2).
Turning to the issue of whether damage to the Fabrys' business
158
reputation could be a personal injury, the court found that it was.
Specifically, the court concluded that the $500,000 recovered by the
Fabrys was justified; that damage to one's business reputation was a
personal injury; and that du Pont's negligence or wrongful conduct
resulted in a personal injury to the Fabrys that injured their business
5
reputation."'
However, the court emphasized "the unique facts of this
case," focusing on the Fabrys' sole proprietorship of their business and
that the Fabrys' nursery business was "part and parcel of their
persona." 6 ° The court stated, "Their business reputation was their
personal reputation."' 6 ' Thus, the court's holding in this case appears
to be as fact-sensitive as the tax court's.
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